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THE RIGHT-TO-WORK IMBROGLIO
JAMES R. EISSINGER*
I. INTRODUCTION
The right-to-work movement originated chiefly as a reaction to
the rise of labor power,' especially the institutionalization of the
labor organization and its growth in membership under the auspices
of the Wagner Act of 1935.2 Political controversy has beset the move-
ment since 1944 when the first contemporary right-to-work law was
passed in the state of Florida.3 Although the controversy peaked
as a national issue in the decade of the fifties, 4 it has recurred spo-
Associate Professor, Texas Tech University School of Law. J.D., 1960, University of
North Dakota. The research for this article was partially financed by the Texas Organized
Research Fund, Texas Tech University.
1. The labor movement arose from individual efforts to form groups with those having
similar interests in order to gain concessions from a powerful employer. The group strug-
gled for recognition through a series of economic setbacks and general hostility by the
courts. In the beginning the courts treated the movement as a criminal conspiracy. Nelles,
The First American Labor Case, 41 YALE L.J. 165 (1931) (discussing the Philadelphia
Cordwainer's Case) (Pa. 1806). The criminal conspiracy doctrine fell into disfavor, and
the courts moved to tort liability and also the Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1
et seq. (1970), as a basis for controlling the group activity. Loewe v. Lawlor, 208 U.S. 274
(1908); United States v. Debs, 64 F. 724 (N.D. I1. 1894), afj'd on other grounds, 158
U.S. 564 (1895). The Clayton Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 12 et seq. (1970), was pro-
claimed as the "magna carta" of American trade unionism. This hope was short-lived.
The Supreme Court emasculated the provisions favorable to labor.
Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Deering, 254 U.S. 443 (1921). The injunction was now in its
primacy as a weapon to be used against labor groups. See F. FRANKFURTER & N. GREEN,
THE LABOR INJUNCTION (1930). The Norris-LaGuardia Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 101 et seq. (1970),
represented the first major victory for labor of any substance. The act with some excep-
tions took away jurisdiction from the federal courts to issue injunctions in cases involving
labor disputes. After a century of striving, the labor movement achieved its goal of recog-
nition and legitimacy by passage of the first comprehensive labor relations act popularly
called the Wagner Act of 1935. The act enabled labor to flourish and become a powerful
political force with a base of millions of worker-members and with finances provided by
these members for furtherance of labor causes. Many believed that the pendulum had
swung too far in labor's favor. There was a reaction at both the state and federal levels.
2. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151 et seq. (1970). The original enactment has to be considered very
favorable to labor. It had several deficiencies in regard to settling internecine labor dis-
putes and did 'not include unfair labor practices on the part of labor organizations. The
act since its original enactment in 1935 has been extensively amended. 61 Stat. 136 (1947),
65 Stat. 601 (1951), 72 Stat. 945 (1958), 73 Stat. 541 (1959).
3. 'FLA. CONST. art. I, § 6. This constitutional provision was originally adopted in 1944.
The controversy surrounding its adoption served as a pattern for subsequent right-to-work
campaigns in other states. Most of the time the political battle over the proposed law was
little more than a power struggle beween organized labor and management. Labor viewed
the right-to-work movement as an attempt to undermine its power base and as a threat
to the worker and group solidarity. Management contended it was a matter of free choice
or freedom of association.
4. During the 1940's and 1950's the legislatures or people of almost every state in the
union were confronted with a right-to-work proposal. ARK. CONST. amend. 34; ARiz.
CONST. art. XXV; GA. ANN. §§ 54-901 to 54-908 (1974) ; Iowk CODE ANN. 736 A.1 to 736
A.8 (Supp. 1974); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 95-78 to 95-83 (1965); S.D. CONST. art. VI, § 2;
TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 50-208 to 50-212 (1966) ; P. SULTAN, RIGHT-TO-WORK LAWS: A STUDY
rN CONSLICr 56-57 (1958). These right-to-work laws were passed before the movement
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radically in" the states that have enacted or adopted right-to-work
provisions.5 When the right-to-work issue has been raised recently,
it has tended to be a mischief-maker, thwarting political fortune
and stifling law reform.8 On this latter account, some questions
about right-to-work laws should be examined anew. What continuing
validity does the right-to-work issue have against the background of
a constantly evolving federal labor legislation? More precisely, what
rights accrue to a working person by passage of a right-to-work law
in addition to those rights already assured by: federal legislation?
How does a right-to-work law affect the overall scheme of federal
labor legislation?
At the outset, a ruminative discussion of right-to-work is compli-
cated three-fold: (1) The laws are difficult to discuss, without recog-
nizing the political harangue into which they are so often cast; 7 the
political propaganda has confounded a clear understanding of the
received its impetus from the enactment of Section 14(b) of the National Labor Relations
Act. Labor-Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 164(b) (1970). Right-to-work became
one of the most heated issues of the political circuit in -the decade of the 1950's. The con-
troversy very likely reached its peak In 1958 when six states, including Ohio and Califor-
nia, held referenda on proposed right-to-work provisions. The proposition lost on every
ballot except in agriculturally-oriented Kansas. The emotion of the issue had been ex-
pended leaving nineteen states with a version of right-to-work supported in their consti-
tutions or statutes. Although the din died down in most states, the issue has not been al-
lowed repose.
5. The most recent upsurges of the old right-to-work controversy occurred in North
Dakota and Texas. In each case right-to-work proponents tried to write a right-to-work
provision into, the state constitutional charters.
6. In 1972 the right-to-work issue was again presented to the people of North Dakota
during an effort to revise the state constitution. The delegates to the constitutional con-
vention voted to incorporate into the proposed new document a provision which read:
There shall be no discrimination against a qualified natural person's right to
practice a trade or profession or a citizen's right to obtain or hold employ-
ment because of race, color, sex, creed, or membership or nonmembership in
a trade, labor or professional organization.
Daily Journal of the Constitutional Convention, Proposed 1972 Constitution for North
Dakota at 525 (Feb. 17, 1972). The proposal was much broader in its coverage than the
state's right-to-work statute. Compare N.D. CENT. CODE § 34-01-14 (1972). Adoption may
well have brought an end to the nation's first integrated bar-the North Dakota Bar As-
sociation. See Lathrop v. Donohue, 367 U.S. 820, 826 n.3 (1961). Labor unions opposed the
section and, as a consequence of its incorporation, the entire constitution. The people of
North Dakota rejected the document at the polls. Although union members constitute a
minority in the state, they are sufficiently strong and cohesive to change the balance in an:
election. The labor vote, together with that portion of any population which is always
against change, could well have defeated a very necessary constitutional revision. It
would be incorrect to maintain that the right-to-work provision was singularly responsible
for the failure of constitutional revision in North Dakota, but it must be listed as one of
the major factors.
Along parallel lines, a right-to-work provision helped defeat another vitally-needed
constitutional revision in the state of Texas. In Texas the proposed constitution did not
receive the approval of the constitutional convention so it was never submitted to the
voters. One of the major Issues at the convention was the Inclusion of a right-to-work
clause which the pro-labor delegates opposed. Overall approval of the constitutional docu-
ment lost by three votes.
7. Right-to-work campaigns have usually been very heated. The propaganda has caused
many distortions, so that it has been almost Impossible to view the issues in their proper
perspective.
See J. DEMPsEY, THE OPERATION OF THE RIGHT-TO-WoRx LAWS 15 (1961). The author
lists six points which form the pattern in carrying out a successful right-to-work campaign:
(1) a persistent and organized effort to get the law passed; (2) the main argument ad-
vanced is some variation of freedom of cholce; (3) burden of lobbying and support comes
from business interests; (4) states have considerable agriculture; (5) proponents dis-
claim any anti-bias against unions or collective bargaining; and lastly, (6) some local event
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issues. The term right-to-work itself is a misnomer and a good ex-
ample of artful propaganda. These laws do not and were never in-
tended to guarantee a right to work or a right to a job.8 (2) Due partly
to the political forum, other misconceptions are brought about by
the indeterminate meaning of some terms used in discussing right-
to-work and the unusual definition of others. For example, there is
no general agreement on the proper characterization of the various
union security devices such as the closed shop, union shop, agency
shop or open shop. 9 Membership in a labor organization may not
mean membership as such but only a requirement that dues be paid
to the organization.1" Dues may be nothing more than a service fee
for actual services rendered.11 (3) Right-to-work laws though enacted
by the states are really an extension of the federal labor regulatiom
and must always be considered in the context of the federal labor
laws. Power to pass right-to-work legislation is not based on those
powers reserved to the states by the tenth amendment to the United
States Constitution, but rather on Section 14 (b) of the National La-
bor Relations Act.12 Thus, the application of right-to-work laws is
limited to the scope of the National Labor Relations Act and those
areas remaining under intrastate regulation. 3 A repeal of Section
14 (b) would render all right-to-work laws, whether statutes or con-
stitutional provisions, ineffective. "
II. THE LAWS
Nineteen states have statutes or constitutional provisions sup-
porting the right-to-work concept.1 5 The laws are diverse in form but
Is needed to stir up anti-union feeling and precipitate the passage of the right-to-work law
See also P. SULTAN, RIGHT-TO-WORK LAWS: A STUDY IN CoNFLICT 63 (1958) (arguments
pro and con on the right-to-work laws).
8. A careful reading of any one of the right-to-work statutes or constitutional provi-
sions will verify the misnomer. The focal point of these statutes is membership or non-
membership In a labor union as a condition of employment. N.D. CENT. CODE § 34-01-14
(1972) states: "The right of persons to work shall not be denied or abridged on account
of membership or nonmembership in any labor union or labor organization .... " ARiz.
CONST. art. XXV, states: "No person shall be denied the opportunity to obtain or retain
employment because of non-membership in a labor organization .. "
9. Some courts have defined these terms in their opinion but for the most part there
Is no general agreement as to their precise meaning or proper usage. There is a tendency
by some to use the terms closed shop and union shop interchangeably. There Is some ques-
tion whether there is any remaining difference between the union shop and agency shop.
For the purposes of this article the terms will be defined in the footnotes when they are
used for the first time.
10. NLRB V. General Motors Corp., 373 U.S. 734, 742 (1963); Radio Officers' Union v.
NLRB, 347 U.S. 17, 41 (1954).
11. [1964-661 Op. N.D. ATTY. GEN. 142. Fees charged to nonmembers should be based
on actual cost.
12. 29 U.S.C. § 164(b) (1970); Retail Clerks Local 1625 v. Schermerhorn, 375 U.S. 96
(1963) ; Retail Clerks Local 1625 v. Schermerhorn, 373 U.S. 746 (1963); Hudson v. Atlan-
tic Coast R.R., 242 N.C. 650, 89 S.E.2d 441 (1955).
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. ALA. CODE tit. 26, § 375 (1958) (enacted in 1953); ARIM. CONST. art. XXV (enacted
In 1946) ; ARK. CONST. amend. 34 (enacted in 1944) ; FLA. CONST. art. I, § 6 (enacted in
1944) ; GA. CODE ANN. §§ 54-901 to 54-908 (1974) (enacted in 1947) ; IOWA CODz ANN. §§
786A.J to 736A.8 (Supp. 1974) (enacted In 1947) ; KAN. CONST. art. 15, § 12 (1969) (enact-
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at the core of most of them is wording like that embodied in the North
Dakota law:
The right of persons to work shall not be denied or abridged
on account of membership or nonmembership in any labor
union or labor organization .... 16
The Arizona law is similar, however, it contains a different emphasis.
The 1946 constitutional amendment reads:
No person shall be denied the opportunity to obtain or retain
employment because of non-membership in a labor organiza-
tion .... 17
This law obviously does not protect the labor union member who is
denied employment because of his memberhsip in a labor organiza-
tion.18 Most state statutes evince a more neutral position by protect-
ing members as well as non-members. 19
The majority of states extend the principle of the North Dakota
statute by specifically prohibiting any requirement that a person
pay dues, fees, or other charges to a labor union as a condition of em-
ployment.20 Contracts which include agreements in violation of the
right-to-work law are declared void.21 A few states make violation of
the right-to-work provisions a crime.
22
ed in 1958); MISS. CONST. art. 7, § 198-A (enacted in 1960); NED. CONST. art. 15, §§
13-15 (enacted in 1946) ; NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 613.290 to 613.300 (1973) (enacted in 1953)
N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 95-78 to 95-83 (1965) (enacted in 1947); N.D. CENT. CODE § 34-01-14
(1972) (enacted in 1947) ; S.C. CODE ANN. § 40-46 to 40-46.8 (1962) (enacted in 1954) ;
S.D. CONST. art. VI, § 2 (enacted in 1946) ; TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 50-208 to 50-212 (1966)
(enacted in 1947); TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. arts. 5154g, 5207a (1971) (enacted in 1947);
UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 34-34-1 to 34-34-16 (1971) (enacted in 1955) ; VA. CODE ANN. §§
40.1-58 to 40.1-69 (Cum. Supp. 1974) (enacted in 1947) ; Wyo. STAT. ANN. §8 27-245.1 to
27-245.8 (1967) (enacted in 1963). ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 81-210 to 217 (1960) ; ARIZ. REv.
STAT. 23-1301 to 1307 (1971); Miss. CODE ANN. 71-1-47 (1973); and NEB. REV. STAT. 88
48-217 to 219 (1968) have right-to-work statutes in addition to the constitutional provi-
sions cited. Louisiana has a right-to-work provision which applies only to agricultural work.
ers, LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 23-881 to 889 (1964).
16. N.D. CENT. CODE § 34-01-14 (1972).
17. ARIZ. CONST. art. XXV.
18. This is not a denial of equal protection as long as Arizona has other statutes protect-
ing union members against discrimination ("yellow dog contracts"). AFL v. American
Sash & Door Co., 335 U.S. 538 (1949).
19. All the state right-to-work laws except ARIZ. CONST. art. XXV and NEV. REv. STAT.
88 613.230 to 613.900 (1973) protect members and nonmembers.
20. ALA. CODE tit. 26 § 375(5) (1958) ; ARK. STAT. ANN. § 81-202 (1960); GA. CODE
ANN. § 54-903 (1974) ; IOWA CODE ANN. § 736A.5 (Supp. 1974) ; Miss. CODE ANN. § 71-1-47
(d) (1973) ; NEB. REV. STAT. § 48-217 (1968); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 95-82 (1965); S.C. CODE
ANN. § 40-46.2(3) (1962) ; TENN. CODE ANN. § 50-210 (1966) ; UTAH CODE ANN. Y 34-34-10
(1974) ; VA. CODE ANN. § 40.1-62 (1970) ; and Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 27-245.4 (1967) prohibit
payment of dues or fees or charges to labor organizations as a condition of employment.
21. Only GA. CODE ANN. § 54-904 (1974) ; Miss. CONST. art. 7 § 198-14; NEV. REV. STAT.
8 613.260 (1973); and TEX. REV. Crv. STAT. art. 5207a, § 3 (1971) declarle void any con-
tract provision contrary to the right-to-work law. ALA. CODE tit. 26 § 375(2) (1958) ; ARZ,
Ruv. STAT. § 23-1302 (1971) ; ARK. STAT. ANN. § 81-203 (1960) ; IowA CODE ANN. § 736A.8
(1974) ; NED. REV. STAT. § 48-217 (1968) ; N.C. GEN. STAT. § 95-79 (1965) ; S.D. COMPILED
LAWS ANN. § 60-85 (1969) ; TENN. CODE ANN. § 50-209 (1966) ; UTAH CODE ANN. §; 84-34-5
(1974) ; and VA. CODE ANN. § 40.1-65 (1970) declare such a contract provision illegal.
22. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 81-204 (1960); IOWA CODE ANN. § 736A.6 (Supp. 1974); NEm.
REV. STAT. § 48-219 (1968) ; S.D. COMPILED LAWS ANN. § 60-8-7 (1969) ; TENN. CODE ANN.
§ 50-212 (1966) ; UTAH CODE ANN. § 34-34-17 (1974) ; VA. CODE ANN. § 40.1-69 (Cum.
Supp. 1974); and WYo. STAT. ANN. § 274-245.8 (1967) attach a criminal penalty to vio-
lation of the statute.
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Membership or non-membership in a labor union as a condition
of employment is at the heart of the legal conflict of interest under-
lying the right-to-work controversy. The conflict is between labor's
right to organize, solidify its strength and preserve the group inter-
est, and the individual worker's right to obtain and keep his job (de-
pending only on the job's continuing availability and the worker's
willingness and ability to do the work) unfettered by organizational
entanglements he may not want. Essentially the cleavage comes
when the group and the individual attempt to exercise fully their
respective rights. What raises the ire of right-to-work advocates is
the federal solution of imposing membership by majority rule (and
employer agreement), rather than by individual consent; this is the
odious compulsory union membership. 23 As a matter of fundamental
importance, right-to-work proponents would present the question as
one of freedom to associate or not associate, or freedom of choice.
They would resolve the issue in favor of absolute individual determi-
nation, a right-to-work law.
The primary focus of these laws is, therefore, membership or non-
membership in a labor union as a condition of employment. The mo-
tivating force behind passage of the laws is the belief that a working
person in a free society should not be required to join a labor organiza-
tion in order to obtain or retain his job. As codified, this tenant would
eliminate compulsory union membership insofar as it may be made
obligatory under Section 8(a) (3) of the National Labor Relations
Act. 2'
Right-to-work laws have withstood the challenge that they are
constitutionally infirm. 25 These laws have also survived the various
attacks as to their general import and specific applicability.2 8 The
two most important questions of continuing relevance, particularly
to the issues raised herein, are those dealing with the coverage or ap-
plication of the right-to-work laws and the forms of union security if
any are permitted thereunder.
The extent to which the right-to-work states may carry out their
policy of individual determination is dependent upon federal statutes
and interpretation of those statutes by the federal courts. Section 14
(b) of the National Labor Relations Act allows the states to prohibit
any agreement requiring membership in a labor organization as a con-
23. Compulsory union membership is the phrase used in the arguments but the federal law
requires only the tender of periodic dues and initiation fees, not membership as that term
is commonly used. NLRB v. General Motors Corp., 373 U.S. 784, 742 (1963).
24. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (1970). The section is set out verbatim at note 92 infra.
25. AFL v. American Sash & Door Co., 335 U.S. 538 (1949) ; Lincoln Fed. Labor Union
v. Northwestern Iron & Metal Co., 335 U.S. 525 (1949).
26. Finney v. Hawkins, 189 Va. 878, 54 S.E.2d 872 (1949). See generally annot., 92
A.L.R.2d 598 (1963).
NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW
dition of employment.27 This section is a statutory exception to the
general proposition that all actions arguably subject to Section 7 and
Section 8 of the Act are within the exclusive jursidiction of the Nation-
al Labor Relations Board, a federal agency.28 Right-to-work laws are
therefore circumscribed by the operative breadth of Section 14 (b)
and the National Labor Relations Act to which it is an exception.2 9
In construing 14 (b) in two agency shop"0 cases, the Supreme Court
felt constrained to transform the key word "membership" into a
term, "whittled down to its financial core," 3' 1 in order to make it par-
allel to the Court's reading of Section 8 (a) (3) in another part of the
NLRA. Although exceptions have generally been given a narrow
construction, in this case the interpretation gave to the exception
greater breadth and to the states leeway to prohibit not only the
union shop,s2 which in its classic form requires membership in a
labor organization, but also less onerous union security arrange-
ments such a's agency shop agreements, 33 which generally do not
require membership in a labor organization as the word member-
ship is usually used.34
States are given the authority by Section 14 (b) to enact right-to-
work laws, interpret them and enforce them.'3 This power is limited,
however, and "begins only with actual negotiation and exeuction of
the type of agreement described by Section 14 (b)."36 State courts,
for example, may not enjoin picketing for a union shop which is pro-
27. 29 U.S.C. § 164(b) (1970): "Nothing in this subchapter shall be construed as au-
thorizing the execution or application of agreements requiring membership in a labor or-
ganization as a condition of employment in any State or Territory in which such execution
or application Is prohibited by State or Territoral law.
28. Retail Clerks Local 1625 v. Schermerhorn, 375 U.S. 96 (1963).
29. Id.; Retail Clerks Local 1625 v. Schermerhorn, 373 U.S. 746 (1963); Hudson v.
Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 242 N.C. 650, 89 S.E.2d 441 (1955).
30. The agency shop Is a form of union security wherein the employer and the exclu-
sive bargaining agent agree that an employee does not need to become a member of the
labor organization representing all the employees, but the employee is required to pay a
service fee to the exclusive bargaining representative which Is usually the equivalent of
regular union dues and initiation fees. The service fee may be limited to the employee's
pro rata share of the actual cost of collective bargaining and administration of the agree-
ment.
31. NLRB v. General Motors Corp., 373 U.S. 734, 742 (1963) ; Retail Clerks Local 1625
v. Sehermerhorn, 373 U.S. 746 (1963).
82. The union shop form of union security requires membership in the labor organization
serving as the exclusive bargaining representative for all the employees In an appropriate
bargaining unit. The employee need not join the labor organization until a designated
time after the date of employment, at least thirty days. This form of union security Is
permitted under the National Labor Relations Act If an employer and the exclusive bar-
gaining agent agree to write such a provision Into the collective bargaining agreement. The
union shop under the NLRA differs from the common understanding of the terms of the
union shop in that "membership" according to the NLRA requires only the tender of per-
iodic dues and initiation fees; actual joining of the organization Is not compelled.
33. NLRB v. General Motors Corp., 373 U.S. 734, 742 (1963); Retail Clerks Local 1625
v. Schermerhorn, 373 U.S. 746 (1963).
34. Refer to note 30 supra.
95. Retail Clerks Local 1625 v. Schermerhorn, 375 U.S. 96 (1963); Retail Clerks Local
1625 v. Schermerhorn, 373 U.S. 746 (1963).
36. Retail Clerks Local 1625 v. Schermerhorn, 375 U.S. 96, 105 (1963) (emphasis theirs).
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hibited by state law.87 Since there has been no actual negotiation and
execution of the type of agreement prohibited, the picketing action
is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the NLRB even if its purpose
could bring about an illegal result according to state law.
Another type of restriction upon the general applicability of the
right-to-work laws can be found in the Railway Labor Act. 8 The un-
ion activities of railroad and airline employees are regulated by the
RLA which authorizes complusory union membership without statu-
tory exception. 9 This means that a state right-to-work law does not
apply to railroad and airline employees and therefore does not have
a universal application to all the workers in the state.4 0 The law is
limited in its force and effect to only those workers covered by the
National Labor Relations Act or those workers remaining under
state authority (no preemption). After the General Motors41 and
Schermerhorn decisions it was clear that any question about the
type of union security agreement allowed under a state right-to-work
law was a matter for the state legal authorities in interpreting their
own right-to-work laws. All of the state courts and opinions of state
attorneys general have been unanimous in declaring all forms of
union security illegal under their respective right-to-work statutes.4 8
Only Indiana4 4 and North Dakota4 5 for a time allowed the agency
shop. Indiana repealed its right-to-work law49 and just recently the
North Dakota Supreme Court, when presented the question, set
37. Id.
38. 45 U.S.C. §§ 151-188 (1970).
39. Id. § 152, Eleventh. This section reads:
Notwithstanding any other provisions of this chapter, or of any other statute
or law of the United States, or Territory thereof, or of any State, any carrier
or carriers as defined in this chapter and a labor organization or labor organi-
zations duly designated and authorited to represent employees in accordance
with the requirements of this chapter shall be permitted-(a) to make agree-
ments, requiring, as a condition of continued employment, that within sixty
days following the beginning of such employment, Or the effective date of
such agreements, whichever is the later, all employees shall become members
of the labor organization representing their craft or class: Provided, That no
such agreement shall require such condition of employment with respect to
employees to whom membership is not available upon the same terms and
conditions as are generally applicable to any other member or with respect to
employees to whom membership was denied or terminated for any reason other
than the failure of the employee to tender periodic dues, initiation fees, and
assessments (not including fines and penalties) uniformly required as a con-
dition of acquiring or retaining membership.
Id.
40. Hudson v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 242 N.C. 650, 89 S.E.2d 441 (1955) Interne.-
tional Ass'n of Machinists v. Sandberry, 277 S.W.2d 776 (Tex. 1954), aff'd, 156 Tex. 840,
295 S.W.2d 412 (1956), cert. denied, 353 U.S. 918 (1957).
41. NLRB v. General Motors Corp., 373 U.S. 734 (1963).
42. Retail Clerks Local 1625 v. Schermerhorn, 373 U.S. 746 (1963).
43. Schermerhorn v. Local 1625 Retail Clerks, 141 So. 2d 269 (Fla. 1962) ; Higgins v
Cardinal Mfg. Co., 188 Kan. 11, 360 P.2d 456 (1961) ; Guard' Assoc. v. Wackenhut Services.
Inc., 86 LRRM 2818 (Nev. 1974) ; Ficek v. International Bhd. of Boilermakers, 219 N.W.2d
860 (N.D. 1974); Op. ARIZ. ATTrY. GEN. 62-2, Nov. 24, 1961; Op. N.C. ATTY. GEN., June
7, 1960; Op. Tnx. ATTY. GEN. WW-1018, 1961.
44. Meade Electric Co. v. Hagberg, 129 Ind. App. 631, 159 N.E.2d 408 (1959).
45. [1952] Op. N.D. ATTY. GE.; [1959] Op. N.D. A=Ty. GEN. 155; [1966] Op. N.D.
ATTY. GEN. 42.
. 46. Indiana had a right-to-work law from 1957-1965
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aside a series of attorney general opinions of twenty-two years stand-
ing and declared the agency shop repugnant to the North Dakota right-
to-work law.47 In Ficek v. International Brotherhood of Boilermak-
ers"5 the court held that the North Dakota law adopted in 1947 pro-
hibited the agency shop form of union security, thus the last bastion
of the agency shop came down. 49
The North Dakota court based its decision on the rationale of
other courts in jurisdictions having similar right-to-work provisions
and on what it perceived as legislative intent in enacting the law. 0
Considering the General Motors51 decision the holding would appear,
at least at first glance, to be a logically sound conclusion. A more pro-
found analysis, however, could have brought about a different re-
sult, especially if the intent of the North Dakota legislature were to
control the interpretation of the North Dakota statute. Although the
Gerreral Motors52 case may have raised some doubt as to the meaning
of membership, the case is not authoritative on how membership
should be construed in the North Dakota statute nor are the authorities
cited by the court any more helpful in determining legislative intent
in this regard.5 3 The key to discerning legislative intent lies in under-
standing the problem which the legislature was attempting to solve
and comparatively evaluating its options. The North Dakota court
acknowledges the problem as one of balancing freedom of choice
or association against the free rider argument.
5 4
The North Dakota legislature should have been well-informed in
coming to its decision, thus it must have had at its disposal the Arizo-
na approach 5 as well as the approach of the several states that had
previously adopted statues specifically prohibiting the payment of fees,
dues or charges to a labor organization as a condition of employ-
ment.56 It rejected these approaches and opted for a very simple
statute that assures a worker he will not be required to join a labor
organization but says nothing about his obligation to pay his fair
47. Ficek v. International Bhd of Boilermakers, 219 N.W.2d 860 (N.D. 1974).
48. Id.
49. Id. at 865-66.
50. Id. at 871.
51. NLRB v. General Motors Corp., 373 U.S. 734 (1963).
52. Id.
53. Public policy, does not really help determine what the legislature intended in Its use
of the word "membership." The authority of "public policy In labor relations" is also not
very persuasive in regard to interpretation of the statute in general. "Declining to associate
with his fellows" does not go to the crux of the argument: does the statute prohibit an
agreement which requires a worker to pay his fair share of the collective bargaining ex-
penses once a bargaining unit has been organized by a vote of the majority.
54. Ficek v. International Bhd. of Boilermakers, 219 N.W.2d 860, 866-71, 871 (N.D.
1974).
55. ARiz. CONST. art. XXV.
56. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 8-202 (1960) (enacted in 1947) ; GA. CODE ANN. § 54-903 (1974)
(enacted in 1947) ; IOWA CODE ANN. § 736A.5 (Supp. 1974) ; (enacted In 1947) ; N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 95-82 (1965) (enacted in 1947); TENN.. CODE ANN. § 50-210 (1966) (enacted in
1947) ; and VA. CODE ANN. § 40.1-62 (1970) (enacted in 1950). These states with
right-to-work provisions specifically prohibiting payment of any fees to a labor organiza-
tion as a condition of employment enacted their right to work laws before or at the time.
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share of the costs of collective bargaining. 7 Some distinctive signi-
ficance must be accorded the North Dakota legislature's approach
and nothing else is apparent except that the legislature did in fact
intend that a worker should pay his fair share of the costs of collective
bargaining if a majority of his fellow workers voted to organize and
the non-member worker received benefits as a result of the collec-
tive bargaining effort.
As an analysis of the federal labor legislation and the cases inter-
preting it will demonstrate, a holding that an agency shop is a per-
mitted form of union security under a right-to-work law would not
render that law obsolete and useless. There are still very important
and viable distinctions between the union shop allowed under the
federal law and the agency shop allowed under a state right-to-work
statute.58 The North Dakota attorney general made the distinctions
even more significant in his interpretation of the agency shop-limit-
ing payment by nonunion members to service fees "sufficient to cov-
er the costs incurred by the bargaining agent which were neces-
sary to properly represent all the employees." 59 Such fees would
not be the equivalent of dues and initiation fees required by the fed-
eral statue.
In its inception the right-to-work movement had several con-
vincing arguments based on individual rights and inadequacies in
the federal labor law to support its cause. There were many cases
under the Wagner Act where employees were expelled from their
union and as a result lost their jobs. Because of its facts the Colgate-
Palmolive-PeeV0 case is illustrative of the problem. Certain employ-
ees attempted to organize and promote a rival union as the exclusive
bargaining agent for their collective bargaining unit. The movement
failed and the union expelled these employees from membership.
Since the collective bargaining agreement provided for a closed
shop,6' upon demand by the union the employer discharged the ex-
pelled workers. It was argued that these employees were only exer-
cising their rights under Section 7 of the NLRA, that is, the right of
employees to freely choose their bargaining representative, but the
Supreme Court sanctioned the closed union, '6 2 closed shop and the
that North Dakota adopted its statute, N.D. CENT. CODE § 34-01-14 (1972) (enacted In
1947). The legislature must have been aware of this particular right-to-work format.
57. N.D. CENT. CODE § 34-01-14 (1972).
58. Refer to text accompanying notes 108-113, infra.
59. OP., supra note 11, at 142.
60. Colgate-Palmolive-Peet Co. v. NLRB, 338 U.S. 855 (1949).
61. A closed shop is a security agreement between employer and labor organization
which requires membership in the labor union as a condition precedent to hiring.
Membership must be maintained while employed or for the duration of the agreement.
Some would consider the union security agreement in this case a variation of the
union shop since there was a provision for employment of nonmember workers under some
conditions. These nonmembers had to become members within a fixed period of time.
62. A closed union will not admit new members except on a very selective basis. Most
of the decisions to exclude would be based on race, color, creed, sex, national origin, family
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discharge on the basis of the law at that time. An applicable right-
to-work law would have prohibited the closed shop agreement and
these employees would not have lost their jobs.
During the years of the Wagner Act the closed union and the
closed shop were permitted to exist side-by-side. Workers, otherwise
qualified, could be kept out of certain skilled trades and thereby
denied employment by a closely controlled local union, which for
the most arbitrary reasons or no reason at all, could refuse to admit
the worker to membership.63 State courts attempted to alleviate the
affects of any labor monopolies created, but only right-to-work laws
could prevent control of area labor market in certain skills.4
The federal law, however, did not remain static. While the right-
to-work campaign thrived and then languished at the state level, im-
portant changes were being implemented in the national labor pol-
icy. In 1947 the Taft-Hartley Act became law.6 5 It amended the Na-
tional Labor Relations Act to include unfair labor practices on the
part of labor organizations.6  Other amendments prohibited the
closed shop and made it more difficult to maintain a closed union.67
Twelve years later charges against unions of financial scandal, cor-
ruption and communist infiltration pressured Congress to pass the
Landrum-Griffin Act68 regulating internal union affairs and includ-
ing a bill of rights for union members. The curtailing of union power
continued into the 1960's when the union group interest had to bend
to the civil rights movement. Activist courts concerned about indivi-
dual rights began discussing first amendment freedoms in the
relationships or to control the supply of labor or the labor market In a given area. Cases
cited notes 63 and 64 infra. The union considers itself a voluntary private organization and
therefore can control its membership by refusing to admit members for the most arbitrary
of reasons or no reason at all. Oliphant v. Brotherhood of Locomtive Firemen & Engine-
men, 262 F.2d 359 (6th Cir. 1958), rehearing denied, 359 U.S. 935, petition for rehearing
denied, 359 U.S. 962 (1959). But see Civil Rights Act of 1964 § 703(c), 42 U.S.C. § 200Oe-
2c (Supp. I, 1972) set out verbatim at note 70 infra.
63. See, e.g., Kotch v. Board of Port Pilot Comm'rs, 330 U.S. 552 (1947); Steele v.
Louisville & Nashville R.R., 323 U.S. 192 (1944) ; Oliphant v. Brotherhood of Locomotive
Firemen & Enginemen, 262 F.2d 359 (6th Cir. 1958), rehearing denied, 359 U.S' 935, 1petf-
tion for rehearing denied, 859 U.S. 962 (1959) ; State Comm'n for Human Rights v. Farrell,
43 Misc. 2d 958, 252 N.Y.S.2d 649 (1964). See also Colgate-PaJmolive-Peet Co. v. NLRB,
338 U.S. 355 (1949).
64. Closed union and closed shop constitute an unlawful interference with a worker's
right to employment. Wilson v. International Bhd. of Boilermakers, 27 Cal. 2d 586, 165
P.2d 903, 905 (1946). Monopoly or near monopoly of the labor market deprives workers
of the right to earn a livelihood. Wilson v. Newspaper & Mail Deliverers' Union, 123 N.J.
Eq. 347, 197 A. 720 (1938). See also Walter v. McCarvel, 309 Mass. 260, 34 N.E.2d 677
(1941) ; Lucke v. Clothing Cutters' & Trimmers' Assembly No. 3507, 77 Md. 396, 26 A. 505
(1893).
65. Labor-Management Relations Act, 61 Stat. 136 (1947). The Act, popularly called the
Taft-Hartley Act, after its primary sponsors, substantially amended the National Labor
Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151 et seq. (1970), but also included new provisions of its
own, 29 U.S.C. §§ 171 et seq. (1970).
66. National Labor Relations Act § 8(b), 29 U.S.C. 8 158(b) (1970).
67. National Labor Relations Act § 8(a) (3), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a) (3) (1970).
68. Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act (1959), 29 U.S.C. 88 401-581 (1970).
This legislation also amended the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151 et seq.
(1970).
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context of trade unionism99 The Civil Rights Act of 1964 forbade dis-
crimination by labor unions on the basis of race, color, religion, sex,
or national origin.70 Even though the success of labor has clearly
been dependent on the cohesion of the group, it can no longer be taken
for granted (if it ever were) that the interests of the group are con-
comitant with the best interests of the individual. It is in light of this
progress made at the federal level in protecting the individual and his
rights that the question about the continuing validity of the right-to-
work argument at the state level may be raised.
III. THE ISSUES
A. THE GOAL OF NATIONAL LABOR POLICY
The joal of national labor legislation is to promote industrial
peace and stability through collective bargaining 11 To achieve this
goal the federal government has devised an intricate scheme, within
constitutional limitations,' 2 to regulate the relations between the in-
dividual or group and the employer whenever the relationship af-
fects interstate commerce.7 2 The National Labor Relations Act7 4 re-
presents a gradual development75 of this labor policy, and its legal
69. Brotherhood of Ry. & Steamship Clerks v. Allen, 373 U.S. 113 (1963) ; International
Ass'n of Machinists v. Street, 367 U.S. 740 (1961) ; Linscott v. Miller Falls Co., 440 F.2d
14 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 372 (1971).
70. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1970), as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2c (Supp. II, 1972).
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for a labor organization-
(1) to exclude or to expel from its membership, or otherwise to discriminate
against, any individual because of his race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin ;
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify its membership or applicants for member-
ship, or to classify or fall or refuse to refer for employment any individual,
in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employ-
ment opportunities, or would limit such employment opportunities or other-
wise adversely affect his status as an employee or as an applicant for employ-
ment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin; or
(3) to cause or attempt to cause an employer to discriminate against an
individual in violation of this section.
Id.
71. National Labor Relations Act § 1, 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1970). The court in Brooks v
NLRB, 348 U.S. 96, 103 (1954) states:
The underlying purpose of this statute is industrial peace. . . . Congress has
devised a formal mode for selection and rejection of bargaining agents and
has fixed the spacing of elections, with a view of furthering industrial sta-
bility and with due regard to administrative prudence.
See also United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960)
Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448 (1957) ; J.I. Case Co. v. NLRB, 321
U.S. 332 (1944) ; NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937).
72. NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937).
73. National Labor Relations Act §§ 2(6), 2(7), 29 U.S.C. § 152 (6) (7) (1970). The
Court In NLRB v. Reliance Fuel Oil Corp., 371 U.S. 224, 226 (1963) stated that In the
National Labor Relations Act "affecting commerce" means the "fullest jurisdictional
breadth constitutionally permissible." Particular Instances are not the key, but rather the
overall Impact that many such instances may have in disrupting commerce. See also Po-
lish National Alliance v. NLRB, 322 U.S. 643 (1944) ; NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel
Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937).
74. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151 et. seq. (1970) [hereinafter referred to as NLRA or the Act].
75. Refer to note 2, supra, discussing the amendments and therefore the change in na-
tional labor policy since the original enactment of the NLRA. Enactment of many other
statutes collateral to the national labor policy has also effected substantial change, for
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requirements are policy decisions on the best way to achieve the goal
of industrial peace.7 6
The NLRA gives the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB),J
a federal agency, exclusive jurisdiction to resolve all labor disputes
arising within the broad, liberally-interpreted78 purview of the Act. 9
State law is preempted as to any labor disputes which are arguably
within Section 7 and Section 8 over which the Board asserts jurisdic-
tion.8 0 There are, of course, exceptions to the rule.81
B. RIGHTS OF EMPLOYEES AND THE SELECTION OF AN EXCLUSIVE
BARGAINING REPRESENTATIVE
The rights of employees are set out in Section 7.82 They shall have
the right to organize, bargain collectively and engage in concerted
activity. They also have the right to refrain from all such activity ex-
cept as qualified by Section 8 (a) (3) .8 At the heart of national labor
policy is the concept of majority rule." A majority of workers in an
appropriate bargaining unit may by their vote make a contract with
the union for all the members of the unit-even the dissenters. Section
example, the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1970), as amended. 42 U.S.C. §
2000e-2c (Supp. II, 1972).
76. See 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1970) and cases cited supra, note 71.
77. 29 U.S.C. §§ 153-56 (1970) [The National Labor Relations Board shall hereinafter
be referred to as the NLRB or the Board]. Powers of the Board are set out in sections
9(b), (c) and 10(a) of the act. 29 U.S.C. §§ 159(b), (c) & 160(a) (1970).
78. This has been the tendency of the courts since the new labor legislation was enacted,
as opposed to the holding in Duplex Co. v. Deering, 254 U.S. 443 (1921), vitiating the in-
tent behind the Clayton Act. NLRB v. Hearst Publications, 322 U.S. 111 (1944) ; U.S. v.
Hutcheson, 312 U.S. 219 (1941).
79. NLRA § 14(c) (1), 29 U.S.C. § 164(c) (1)
The Board, in its discretion, may, by rule of decision or by published rules
adopted pursuant to the Administrative Procedure Act, decline to assert jur-
isdiction over any labor dispute involving any class or category of employers,
where, in the opinion of the Board, the effect of such labor dispute on com-
merce is not sufficiently substantial to warrant the exercise of its jurisdic-
tion: Provided, That the Board shall not decline to assert jurisdiction over
any labor dispute over which it would assert jurisdiction under the standards
prevailing upon August 1, 1959.
80. The leading case setting out the doctrine of preemption in respect to labor relations
and the exclusivity of NLRB jurisdiction is San Diego Building Trades Council v. Gar-
mon, 359 U.S. 236 (1959). See also Motor Coach Employees v. Lockridge, 403 U.S. 274
(1971).
81. Most of the exceptions are noted in Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171 (1967). See also
Linn v. Plant Guard Workers, 383 U.S. 53 (1966) ; Hanna Mining Co. v. Marine Engineers
Benefit Assoc., 382 U.S. 181 (1965).
82. NLRA § 7, 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1970), provides:
Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist
labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their
own choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of
collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection, and shall also have
the right to refrain from any or all such activities except to the extent that
such right may be affected by an agreement requiring membership in a labor
organization as a condition of employment as authorized in NLRA § 8(a) (3),
29 U.S.C. § 158(a) (3) (1970).
83. Id.
84. "The majority-rule concept is today unquestionably at the center of our federal labor
policy." NLRB v. Allis Chalmers Mfg Co., 388 U.S. 175, 180 (1967) quoting Wellington,
Union Democracy and Fair Representation: Federal Responsibility In a Federal System,
67 YALE L.J. 1827, 1333 (1958).
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985 sets up the framework within which employees may carry out
their right to organize. If a majority of employees in an appropriate
bargaining unit, that is, employees with a mutuality of interest,6
vote to orgainze, they may designate an exclusive bargaining repre-
sentative for the purpose of carrying out collective bargaining. This
bargaining representative may be a union, internationally-affiliated,
or any association or group formed by the employees as long as it is
not employer-dominated.17 The objective of Sections 7 and 9 is not
only to give employees the right to organize but also the means to do
SO.
Practical application of these rights means that workers may
consider it to their advantage to approach the employer as a group
to ask for increased benefits.88 A group effort can add strength to
their side at the bargaining table. If a majority of employees at the
place of work do not see this advantage, there is no organization and
hence no exclusive bargaining representative. Once the majority has
voted to organize, however, and selected a bargaining representative,
a duty is imposed on the bargaining agent to represent all of the em-
ployees in the unit fairly89-whether they are members of the organ-
85. NLRA § 9(a), 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1970), provides:
Representatives designated or selected for the purposes of collective bargaining
by the majority of the employees in a unit appropriate for such purposes,
shall be the exclusive representatives of all the employees in such unit for
collective bargaining in respect to rates of pay, wages, hours of employment,
or other conditions of employment ...
86. The Board makes the determination on the appropriate bargaining unit. NLRA §9(b), 29 U.S.C. § 159(b) (1970). Mutuality of interest is the primary factor In coming to
a determination. Whether a plantwide unit or a craft unit is appropriate depends on addi-
tional factors.
87. NLRA § 2(5), 29 U.S.C. § 152(5) (1970). It is an unfair labor practice for an em-ployer to dominate or interfere with any labor organization. NLRA § 8(a) (2), 29 U.S.C. §
158 ea)(2) (1970).
88. The labor movement in America is dependent upon the group interest for its strength
and success. The legal process reflected' in the development of this group interest Is amongthe moat complex and fascinating in Anglo-American jurisprudence. Of special significance
is the difficulty encountered in promoting the "group"-now recognized as a cornerstone
of the power structure of twentieth century American society and government. See Vege-lahn v. Guntner, 167 Mass. 92, 44 N.. 1077, 1079 (1896) (J. Holmes dissenting); Plant
v. Woods, 176 Mass. 492, 57 N.E. 1011, 1015 (1900) (J. Holmes dissenting). The low pointin trying to achieve solidarity of the group in the labor movement came in Hitchman Coal& Coke Co. v. Mitchell, 245 U.S. 229 (1917). See Blumrosen, Group Interest in Labor Law,
13 RUTGERs L. REv. 432 (1959).
The labor group matured and garnered strength from the various labor acts sup-porting it. The labor organization was no longer to be a floundering, disorganized associa-tion striving for status, but rather an established institution in our society-a primary
group. Industrialization and the encroachment of the mass media solidified pressures to-
ward fad, uniformity and ideological conformity. The response has been a gradual shiftfrom the interest of the group to interest in the individual and his rights and privileges.This flux affected the labor organization as much as any other group. The movement has
now come full circle. Whereas, in the beginning, individual workers attempted to group
together to gain concessions from their employer, now that the group has gained status
and taken on the cloak of establishment, its role has become one of protecting itself. Dis-
senters try to break away from the uniformity and conformity Imposed in striving for any
group goal.
89. NLRA § 9, 29 U.S.C. § 159 (1970), impresses on the exclusive bargaining agent theduty of representing all the employees of the unit. The duty of fair representation is ajudicially created obligation originating in Steele v. Louisville & Nashville R.R., 323 U.S.192 (1944); Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171 (1967); Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman, 345 U.S.330 (1953). A discussion of the extent of the duty of fair representation and whether It
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ization or not. The primary reason for a representative's certifica-
tion is to gain benefits for the employees. If he carries out his charge
effectively, benefits should accrue to all the workers in the unit.
If the representative does not do his job, he can be decertified.9 0
Compulsory union membership in the national labor scheme of
regulation is justified for the most part by the principle of exclusivity
and the duty imposed on the exclusive bargaining agent to represent
all the employees in the bargaining unit, whether they are members
of the labor organization or not. The "free rider" argument appeals
to the canons of fairness. A majority of workers through the demo-
cratic process have selected a bargaining agent. This agent incurs
expenses in carrying out his statutory obligations which may include
the salary of the employees' negotiator, the costs of negotiating and
administering the agreement and the cost of operating the grievance
and arbitration machinery. The representative has a duty to repre-
sent all the employees, and the respresentative's efforts, if success-
ful, obtain benefits for the entire group. Every employee, for exam-
ple, has a right to file a grievance if a grievance procedure is es-
tablished.9' It is only logical that employees benefiting as a result of
the bargaining agent's work should pay a pro rata share of the costs.
To allow some employees to escape their financial obligations (be
"free riders") by making membership voluntary necessarily in-
creases the financial burden of other employees. Allowing "free rid-
ers" would be basically unfair.
C. COMPULSORY UNION MEMBERSHIP
The pith of the right-to-work controversy can be found in the pro-
viso to Section 8 (a) (3) 92 which Congress enacted as a partial response
reaches far enough to protect individual rights can be found in Clark, The Duty of Fair
Representation: A Theoretical Structure, 51 TEX. L. REV. 1119 (1973).
90. Decertification is authorized by NLRA § 9, 29 U.S.C. § 159 (1970).
91. In Hughes Tool Co., 104 NLRB 818 (1953) a union required nonmembers to pay a
fee for handling grievances to arbitration. The NLRB did not allow the fee. The Board
could have revoked the union's certification since it was the union's duty to represent all
the employees without discrimination. In Port Drum Co., 170 NLRB 555 (1968), the Board
held that a union committed an unfair labor practice when it refused to arbitrate the
case of a discharged employee who was not a member.
92. NLRA § 8(a)(3), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a) (3) (1970), reads:
It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer by discrimination in re-
gard to hire or tenure of employment or any term or condition of employ-
ment to encourage or discourage membership in any labor organization:
Provided, That nothing in this Act, or in any other statute of the United
States, shall preclude an employer from making an agreement with a labor
organization to require as a condition of employment membership therein on
or after the thirtieth day following the beginning of such employment or
the effective date of such agreement, whichever is the later, (i) if such
labor organization is the representative of the employees as provided in sec-
tion 159(a) of this title, in the appropriate collective-bargaining unit covered
by such agreement when made; and (ii) unless following an election held as
provided in section 159(e) of this title within one year preceding the effec-
tive date of such agreement, the Board shall have certified that at least a
majority of the employees eligible to vote in such election have voted to rescind
the authority of such labor organization to make such an agreement: Pro-
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to the "free rider" argument. Sections 8 (a) (3) and 8 (b) (2)98 pro-
hibit discrimination in hiring, firing and conditions of employment
which influence membership in a labor organization. 94 An exception
to this rule allows an employer and labor organization, which has
been designated an exclusive bargaining representative to make
an agreement requiring bargaining representative, to make an agree-
ment requiring membership in the organization as a condition of
employment within thirty days after being hired. The language pre-
cludes an employer or union from discriminating against an em-
ployee for not being a member of the labor organization when he ap-
lies for employment; thus, a closed shop9 5 agreement requiring mem-
bership before being hired is unlawful. A classic union shop arrange-
ment, however, compelling a worker to join the labor organization
and maintain his membership once he has been working at least
thirty days is permitted. 96 But the exception is qualified by the fur-
ther proviso limiting enforcement of the first. This proviso reads:
[N]o employer shall justify any discrimination against an em-
ployee for nonmembership in a labor organization (A) if he
has reasonable grounds for believing that such membership
was not available to the employee on the same terms and con-
ditions generally applicable to other members, or (B) if he
has reasonable grounds for believing that membership was
denied or terminated for reasons other than the failure of the
employee to tender the periodic dues and the initiation fees
uniformly required as a -condition of acquiring or retaining
membership.9 7
In 1951 the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals enforced an order
of the National Labor Relations Board in the case of Union Starch &
Refining Co. v. NLRB,9 8 based on its construction of this proviso. The
complainants were former employees of the company who had been
discarged upon union request because they had failed to make an ap-
vied further, That no employer shall justify any discrimination against an
employee for nonmembership in a labor organization (A) if he has reasonable
grounds for believing that such membership was not available to the em-
ployee on the same terms and conditions generally applicable to other mem-
bers, or (B) if he has reasonable grounds for believing that membership was
denied or terminated for reasons other than the failure of the employee to
tender the periodic dues and the initiation fees uniformly required as a con-
dition of acquirng or retaining membership....
93. NLRA § 8(b)(2), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(2) (1970), provides:
It shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor organization or its agent to
cause or attempt to cause an employer to discriminate against an employee
in violation of subsection (a) (3) or to discriminate against an employee with
respect to whom membership in such organization has been denied or termi-
nated on some ground other than his failure to tender the periodic dues and
the initiation fee uniformly required as a condition of acquiring or retaining
membership.
94. Radio Officers' Union v. NLRB, 347 U.S. 17 (1958) ; Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB.
313 U.S. 177 (1941).
95. Refer to note 61 supra for definition.
96. Refer to note 32 supra for definition.
97. NLRA § 8(a)(3), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a) (8) (1970).
98. 186 F.2d 1008 (7th Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 815 (1951).
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plication for membership, attend a union meeting and take the un-
ion oath of loyalty. These employees had offered to pay the dues and
initiation fees. The Board held that the employer and union had com-
mitted an unfair labor practice. The court and Board agreed that on
the basis of the statute, a union may impose any reasonable conditions
or qualifications for membership and keep employees out of the un-
ion if they do not comply; but the sole basis for discharge or causing
a discharge from the job is the failure of an employee to tender per-
iodic dues or initiation fees. The last proviso protects the employee
from discharge for any other reason.99 Two years later the Supreme
Court, in discussing the element of "membership" in its decision in
Radio Officers v. NLRB, 100 cited the Union Starch decision saying:
[C]ongress intended to prevent utilization of union security
agreements for any purpose other than to compel payment of
union dues and fees. Thus Congress recognized the validity
of unions' concern about the "free riders," i. e., employees
who receive the benefits of union representation but are un-
willing to contribute their share of financial support to such
union, and gave unions the power to contract to meet that
problem while withholding from unions the power to cause
the discharge of employees for any other reason. .... 101
Since these decisions, the cases are legion on this aspect of Sec-
tion 8(a) (3),102 settling the issue in respect to denying or termin-
ating membership3 and further defining the meaning of periodic
99. Id. at 1011-12.
100. 347 U.S. 17 (1953).
101. Id. at 41.
102. NLRB v. General Motors Corp., 373 U.S. 734 (1963). Refer to notes 104-106 infra.
103. NLRB Chairman Miller in his dissent to the decision of the NLRB in Hershey Foods
Corp., 207 NLRB 141 (1974), read the provisos very narrowly. The employee had volun-
tarily resigned from the union and the union demanded his discharge. Chairman Miller
maintained that on the facts (1) the union security agreement requiring membership was
unlawful; (2) membership was available upon the same terms as was generally applicable
to others; and (3) membership was not terminated or denied, therefore, the proviso pro-
tecting the employees from dishcarge for any other reason than the failure to pay periodic
dues and initiation fees was not applicable. The majority rejected this argument on the
basis of NLRB v. General Motors Corp., 373 U.S. 734 (1963) and Union Starch Refining
Co. v. NLRB, 186 F.2d 1008 (7th Cir. 1951).
The importance of this dissent is that the interpretation is logical and is not pre-
cluded by language of the General Motors opinion. If It would eventually prevail, it could
effectively prevent a union member from resigning. This would make NLRA § 8(a) (3),
29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (1970), supportive of the maintenance-of-membership form of
union security, that is, once a worker has joined the union he shall remain a member for
the duration of the agreement. Maintenance-of-membership would add another distinguish-
ing characteristic to the difference between the union shop under § 8(a) (3) and the agency
shop. Refer to notes 30 & 32 supra.
The weakness in Chairman Miller's dissent is In the judicial opinion to the con-
trary. Refusing to join (the factual situation in Union Starch) does not violate any of the
precepts set down by Miller, yet the court did not condone the discharge. The question
remains, nonetheless, whether there is an effective difference between refusing to join and
voluntarily resigning. One distinction of little relevance is that the facts behind refusal tojoin are generally more compelling than the reasons for resigning.
Another important issue raised by the dissent is the impact of Miller's view on
union discipline. Refer to text accompanying notes 110-12 infra. The practical but intoler-
able result could be that workers would be wise not to join the union. This would permit
control by a few, once a majority have by secret ballot vgted to organize.
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dues and initiation fees. An employee may not be discharged from
his employment for failing to pay special assessments 1 4 or fines,10 5
or failing to be a member in good standing. 0 6 Tardiness in payment
of dues and initiation fees may not be a basis for discharge so long
as they are paid before certification for discharge actually takes
place.'07
D. UNION SHOP V. AGENCY SHOP
What real distinction still exists between the 8 (a) (3) union shop
and the traditional agency shop arrangement is debatable.10 There
are two differences, nonetheless, which may be of continuing im-
portance. The 8 (a) (3) union shop security clause requires payment
of periodic dues and initiation fees, whereas the agency shop agree-
ment demands payment of a service fee. The terms dues and service
fees may sometimes mean the same thing, but cannot be used inter-
changeably. The service fee may be limited to a payment by the non-
members of an amount not exceeding the actual cost of representation
and benefits provided by the union shared on a pro rata basis. This
amount may not equal dues and initiation fees.'01
The single difference cited by the Supreme Court in NLRB v. Gen-
eral Motors Corp. 10 was that under a union shop provision an employ-
ee may be enrolled as a member by the union, if it so chooses, after he
has paid his dues and initiation fees. The choice is clearly the union's
to make. Conversely, under the agency shop the choice is made by
the employee as to whether he will become a member or not. This
difference becomes more significant when related to another aspect
of compulsory union membership raised in NLRB v. Textile Work-
ers"' and Booster Lodge No. 405 v. NLRB." 2 The complainants had
been union members who had participated in a strike-vote. During
104. NLRB v. Food Fair Stores, Inc., 307 F.2d 3 (3d Cir. 1962) ; Journeyman Plasterers'
v. NLRB, 341 F.2d 539 (7th Cir. 1965) ; NLRB v. Die & Tool Makers Lodge No. 113, 231
F.2d 298 (7th Cir. 1956).
105. NLRB v. Eclipse Lumber Co., 199 F.2d 684 (9th Cir. 1952) ; NLRB v. Leece-Neville
Co., 330 F.2d 242 (6th Cir. 1964) ; NLRB v. Longshoremen's Local 17, 431 P.2d 872 (9th
Cir. 1970); Associated Home Builders v. NLRB, 145 NLRB 1775, enforced 352 F.2d 745
(9th Cir. 1965) (Union could not transfer dues payments to satisfy fines, thus requiring
members to pay dues again or face discharge).
106. NLRA § 8(a)(3), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (1970), insulates employee's jobs from
organizational rights; employees may be good, bad or indifferent members of the union.
Radio Officers v. NLRB, 947 U.S. 17, 40 (1953); NLRB v. Local 50, American Bakery &
Confection Wkrs. U., 339 F.2d 324 (2d Cir. 1964) ; NLRB v. Bell Aircraft Corp., 206 F.2d
235, (2d Cir. 1953).
107. Brady v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 401 F.2d 87 (3d Cir. 1968), cert. denied 393
U.S. 1048 (1969); International Union of Electrical R. & M. Wkrs. v. NLRB, 307 F.2d
679 (D.C. Cir. 1962), cert. denied 371 U.S. 936 (1962). Union by Its actions waived delin-
quent dues; discharge was an unfair labor practice. NLRB v. Brotherhood of Teamsters, 458
F.2d 222 (9th Cir. 1972).
108. Refer to definition of agency shop and union shop at notes 30 & 32 supra.
109. Op., supra note 11, at 142.
110. 373 U.S. 734, 743-44 (1963).
111. NLRB v. Textile Workers, 409 U.S. 213 (1972).
112. Booster Lodge No. 405 v. NLRB, 412 U.S. 84 (1973).
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the strike they resigned from the union and returned to work for which
the union disciplined them by imposing fines. The Court held that
since there was no impediment to their resignations in the union
constitutions and bylaws, the workers could resign, and since they
were no longer members, the union could not discipline them. These
sets of facts and decisions will inevitably raise the question of how
stringent a union constitution and bylaws may be 'in restricting resig-
nation of members. The result could give advantage to the union
having a union shop agreement if the union could keep all the em-
ployees on its rolls and restrict resignations in its constitutions and
bylaws on a reasonable basis, thereby subjecting all the employees
in the unit to union discipline. The union could not have the erring
member discharged, but it could fine him and have the fine en-
forced on a contract theory in the state courts. 13
E. THE REAL ISSUE AT THE FEDERAL LEVEL
Membership, therefore, in the dictionary-sense of the word, is
not required under the Act. At the very most a worker can be compel-
led, thirty days after being hired, to tender payment of dues and ini-
tiation fees, but only if (1) an exclusive bargaining representative has
been properly selected by a majority of the employees at the place
of work, and (2) the employer and representative (as agent for these
very same employees) have agreed to write a union security clause
requiring such payments into the collective bargaining contract.
The duty to pay dues and initiation fees arises from this private agree-
ment.
This section represents a compromise to accommodate the free-
dom of association arguments of the right-to-work protagonists and
the "free rider" (fair play) arguments of the union. It could well be
asserted: there is no violation of the freedom of association-member-
ship is not required, so, neither is association; the statute and case
law have eliminated "compulsory union membership" and thereby
the need for right-to-work laws. 114
Being compelled to pay dues to an orgainzation or group is not
113. NLRB v. Boeing Co., 412 U.S. 92 (1973) ; NLRB v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 388 U.S.
175, 177-82 (1967) (Court enforcement of fines is a necessary consequence of the contract
theory of the union-member relationship).
114. Right-to-work advocates can still argue about the obligation to pay dues-a fee for
services rendered but not requested. An analogy to the government and Its taxing power
can be drawn; one cannot refuse to pay taxes when one renounces his citizenship so long
as he continues to live within the boundaries of this country-the non-citizen receives
the benefits of roads and schools whether he requests them or not. To be sure labor
unions and management are power groups in the private sector and do not have the sover-
eignty or the support of constitutional government of the people behind them. The United
States, however, through the labor acts, has delegated authority. See Steel v. Louisville
& Nashville R.R., 823 U.S. 192, 198-99 (1944). Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation
Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960), allowed the labor organization and the employer, through the
process of collective bargaining and agreement, to set up a form of industrial self-govern-
ment. Id. at 579-80.
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like being forced to become a group member, adhering to group dis-
cipline and being associated with the group's stands on the issues of
the day. The dues-paying requirements do not violate any constitu-
tional precepts so long as the dues are for services rendered; it is fair
for the recipient of benefits to share in the cost of obtaining them.115
The challenges to payment of compulsory dues and initiation
fees have been based primarily on objections to use of these moneys
for political purposes and on religious grounds. The crux of the ob-
jection is giving financial support to causes to which the payor may
not necessarily subscribe or paying compulsory tolls to private organ-
izations116 with which the payor may be in ideological or conscientious
disagreement. There is no valid legal basis for attacking the statute
which authorizes these exactions so long as the financial resources
so collected are spent for negotiating expenses, administration of the
agreement or the costs of carrying out the grievance and arbitration
procedures." 7 A challenge would most likely not be sustained if expen-
ditures are closely related to the duties of the exclusive bargaining
representative and the benefits received by all the employees.:1 8 It
is the use of the dues and initiation fees for purposes beyond these
basic expenses, especially for political activity, which is disputed.
The leading cases challenging the compulsory exaction of dues to
support political activity have arisen from Section 2, Eleventh, of the
Railway Labor Act." 9 This section is similar to Section 8(a) (3). In
International Association of Machinists v. Street"20 the employees ob-
jected to the union's action in spending a portion of their compulsory
dues and initiation fees for political purposes. The compulsory nature
of the exaction was upheld as constitutional, but the Court interpreted
the section to restrict labor organizations in the ways they may ex-
pend the funds collected in this compulsory manner. The words of
the Court per Justice Brennan were: the unions are denied, "over
an employee's objection, the power to use his exacted funds to support
115. In Railway Employee's Dept. v. Hanson, 351 U.S. 225 (1956) the Supreme Court
rejected the contention that compulsory payment of dues infringed the right of associa-
tion. See also Lathrop v. Donohue, 367 U.S. 820 (1961) wherein seven members of the
Court found no constitutional infirmity in being required to pay dues to the state bsr
association in order to practice law.
116. The labor organization has tradlilonally been considered a voluntary private organi-
zation. Oliphant v. Locomotive Firement & Enginemen, 262 F.2d 359 (6th Cir. 1959).
See also Steele v. Louisville & Nashville R.R., 323 U.S. 192 (1944). Its voluntary private
stature, however, should not be confused with its role as an exclusive bargaining repre-
sentative for a group of employees, the primary purpose for which labor unions are formed.
The exclusive bargaining role is an agency relationship created by the federal government,
and rights In this role are enforced by a governmental agency, the NLRB and the federal
courts. When acting as an exclusive bargaining agent, therefore, the labor organization
must lose a degree of its voluntary private characteristic.
117. Railway Employees' Dept. v. Hanson, 351 U.S. 225 (1956).
118. Id.
119. 45 U.S.C. § 152, Eleventh (1970).
120. 367 U.S. 740 (1961).
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political causes which he opposes." ' 121 The objection of the employee
is a necessary element. The Court expressed no opinion on any other
union expenditures which an employee might oppose. 2 2 The case
of the Brotherhood of Railway Clerks v. Allen 28 provided a remedy of
a proportionate refund and a reduced exaction in the paymerit of fu-
ture dues.
One of the practical difficulties with the Street decision is pointed
out in the dissent.124 If it can be assumed that the exclusive bargaining
representative has a right to have the fair cost of his operation paid
for equally by those who benefit from it, the point in issue becomes
one of degree of relatedness or directness of the benefit. Where is the
line to be drawn between the activity which is acceptable for expendi-
ture of funds and that which is not? Although no one wants to force an
employee to contribute support to political, religious or social move-
ments with which he does not agree, it cannot be gainsaid that poli-
tically-active labor unions may achieve as much benefit for the em-
ployees they represent by lobbying for prolabor legislation and
electing pro-labor candidates as they do at the negotiating table.
The second question raised by the decision is of a technical na-
ture. Could the Court, as an alternative to its interpretation of Section
2, Eleventh of the Railway Act, have avoided the constitutional issue
by finding there was no "state action" involved? Section 2, Eleventh
like Section 8 (a) (3) is only permissive. The obligation to pay dues
and initiation fees arises from a private contract negotiated by an
employer and labor organization, essentially private parties. This
theory rises to a higher level of importance when applying the ration-
ale of the Street case to causes of action on a similar set of facts based
on Section 8 (a) (3). Although the wording of Section 8 (a) (3) and Sec-
tion 2, Eleventh are similar, the state action requisite for application
of constitutional protection may be weakened by the unique charac-
teristics of the NLRA, especially the exception created by Section
14 (b) .125
Taking into account the whole of the national labor scheme, it
would seem reasonable to apply the Street decision to unions under the
jurisdiction of the NLRA. 26 A dividing line between appropriate and
121. Id. at 768-69.
122. Id. at 769.
123. 373 U.S. 113, 122 (1963).
124. Machinists v. Street, 367 U.S. 740, 797-819 (1961) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
125. .,In NLRA matters, the federal government does not appear to have so far insinuated
itself into the decision of a union and employer to agree to a union security clause so as
to make that choice governmental action for purposes of the first and fifth amendments."
Reid v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 443 F.2d 408, 410-11 (10th Cir. 1971), second appeal
at 479 F.2d 517 (10th Cir. 1973). See also, Buckley v. American Fed. of Television &
Radio Artists, 496 F.2d 305 (2d Cir. 1974) ; H. WELLINGTON, LA13OR AND THE LEGAL PRo-
CESS 252-64 (1968).
126. Seay v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 427 F.2d 996 (9th Cir. 1970); Linscott v. lMiller
Falls Co., 440 F.2d 14 (1st Cir. 1971).
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inappropriate expenditure would be discernible only after sufficient
objections had been raised and decisions rendered according to the
circumstances of the individual case. This would allow some pro-
tection for the individual, contingent upon his objection, and yet
would permit the union to carry out its objectives within the law.
Another answer to objectionable political contributions by la-
bor unions is provided by statutes which make it unlawful for labor
organizations to contribute or expend moneys for the election of
candidates to federal office. 127 The essential element in determining
a violation of these statues is the voluntariness of the contribution to
the fund used for political purposes. 12 When unions establish sepa-
rate political funds, resources for the fund may not come from com-
pulsory dues and initiation fees.1 2 9 Donations to these union funds
should be voluntary. Enforcement of these statutes would prevent
use of dues and initiation fees to support federal political candidates
which individual members or non-members may be against. It would
set a dividing line for the use of compulsory dues between support
of political' candidates (illegal) and lobbying efforts for legislation
beneficial to labor, members and non-members alike (legal)-a suit-
able compromise.
Religious objectors have not fared so well as those who protested
the channeling of their funds toward political purposes. The hardest
case on the facts was brought in 1956 shortly after the Railway Labor
Act had been amended to allow a union shop notwithstanding any
statute or law.13 0 The plaintiffs had worked for the railroad since 1914
and 1917; they had for these years of service earned valuable bene-
fits. As members of a sect called the Plymouth Brethern they ob-
jected to being "unequally yoked together with unbelievers"'' 31 and
paying money into a common treasury to support unbelievers. They
did volunteer to pay an amount equal to dues and initiation fees to a
charity. The unions asked the employing railroads to dismiss these
employees because they had failed to pay the dues and initiation fees
required by the terms of the collective bargaining agreement. The
plaintiff religious objectors lost. Since this case arose under the
Railway Labor Act a state right-to-work law would not have helped
them.1 3 2
Recently Seventh-Day Adventists have been the predominate
group challenging the requirement of paying dues and initiation fees
127. 18 U.S.C. § 610 (1970), as amended, 18 U.S.C. § 610 (Supp. II, 1972).
128. Pipefitters Local 562 v. United States, 407 U.S. 385 (1972).
129. Id. at 415, 430.
130. Wicks v. Southern Pac. R.R., 231 F.2d 130 (1956), cert. denied, 351 U.S. 946 (1956).
131. II Corinthians 6, v. 14: "Be ye not unequally yoked together with unbelievers: for
what fellowship hath righteousness with unrighteousness? and what communion hath Light
with darkness?"
132. Hudson v. Atlantic C. R.R., 242 N.C. 650, 89 S.E.2d 441 (1955).
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to labor organizations. Although the doctrine of the church does not
demand resistance to membership or these tolls, the basic belief is
opposed to "striving.' ' 3 3 The gravamen of the cause is a matter of
individual conscience which will not allow the Seventh-Day Adven-
tists to participate or support any concept of striving. Thus, paying
moneys into a common treasury, a part of which is used to support
strikes and picketing may be contrary to religious beliefs determined
on an individual basis. 3 4 Does payment of dues and initiation fees
inhibit the free exercise of their religion? The federal courts of ap-
peals have uniformly turned back the challenge. 3 5 Most recently the
compulsory payment of dues and initiation fees has been challenged
by the Adventists as a religious discrimination under the Civil Rights
Act of 1964.186 The challenge did achieve a reversal in the court of ap-
peals but it was not a clear-cut victory. The court reversed, noting
that an attempt to make a reasonable accommodation is required
if it can be accomplished without undue hardship.1 7 The opinion did
reflect a certain pessimism about the chances for accommodation
but stated it was a matter for the district court to determine.
38
The opinions of the various courts of appeals confronted with
bona fide religious objectors have not been convincing, especially
if the reasoning reached the point of balancing interests. 3 9 It is diffi-
cult to conceive of compulsory payment of dues and initiation fees,
considering the legislative exception allowed by Section 14 (b), as a
compelling state interest.140 A narrow exception would not bring
the labor movement to its knees nor thwart the goal of industrial
peace. There is a factual parallel to the Amish insistance on edu-
cating their own children and the Wisconsin statute compelling atten-
dance at the state's accredited schools. The statute would seem to
represent a much more compelling state interest.141 Beyond the le-
gal niceties the courts and labor unions appear to be taking a position
of undue rigidity.
IV. CONCLUSION
The individual and his rights are of primary importance in esti-
mating the continuing worthwhileness of right-to-work laws. As
right-to-work proponents contend, a citizen-worker should be free
133. Gray v. Gulf, M. & 0. R.R., 429 F.2d 1064, 1066 n.4 (5th Cir. 1970).
134. Id.
135. Hammond v. United Papermakers, 462 F.2d 174 (6th Cir. 1972); Linscott v. Miller
Falls Co., 440 F.2d 14 (1st Cir. 1971) ; Gray v. Gulf, M. & 0. R.R., 429 F.2d 1064 (5th
Cir. 1970) ; Otten v. B. & 0. R.R., 205 F.2d 58 (2nd Cir. 1953).
136. Yott v. North American Rockwell Corp., 501 F.2d 398 (9th Cir. 1974).
137. Id. at 403.
138. Id.
139. Linscott v. Miller Falls Co., 440 F.2d 14 (1st Cir. 1971).
140. Id. at 17.
141. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
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to associate or not associate as it fits his purpose. He should be free
to pursue his livelihood. These considerations, however, do not
settle the right-to-work issue, neither rights nor freedoms have ever
been accorded such "absoluteness."
Notwithstanding that there may be a right to work, a right-to-
work law does not insure it. Right-to-work concerns itself only with
a single facet of the right or freedom to associate or freedom of
choice. This concern, by construction of the federal statutes, has been
pared to a contention that an individual worker should not be required
to pay dues and initiation fees to a labor organization in order to keep
his job. The purpose for requiring payment of these dues and initia-
tion fees becomes the crucial factor.
That the individual can acquire a benefit from right-to-work legis-
lation there can be no doubt. This benefit to the individual comes at
the detriment of his fellow workers. The discrimination effected by
a right-to-work law is that it penalizes those workers who have elected
to organize, as it is their right to do under federal legislation. Those
employees who have selected the exclusive bargaining agent must
pay their own allocation of the collective bargaining costs plus a per-
centage for those who choose not to pay their share. Electing to or-
ganize thus- becomes more expensive to the individual worker and
automatically increases the number who may vote against it; this
hampers organizational efforts and is contrary to the spirit of na-
tional labor policy-workers should be free to organize.
The goal of national labor policy is to promote industrial peace
and stability. To this end an apparatus for negotiation between
employer and employees has been set up. An open shop enforced
by a right-to-work law does not lend itself to achieving the goal. Under
the open shop the extreme social pressures to join are not eliminated.
A majority of the workers have authorized the exclusive bargaining
agent to act on their behalf; they are willing to pay the agent for his
services because they believe he will negotiate increased benefits
for them. The friction within the unit between those paying the bills
and those not doing so-where the benefits are being received by all-
can be intense. Where voluntarism as to payment of dues and initia-
tion fees is eliminated, the worker is not required to join but does pay
his fair share of the expenses; as a consequence his fellow workers
do not care whether he is a member or not.
Section 8 (a) (3)142 requires a worker to tender dues and initiation
fees as a condition of employment. The tender is demanded only if
an employer and an exclusive bargaining agent have agreed to it.
The section offers a compromise to the basic conflict between the
right to freely associate and the worker's demand for fair play, that
142. NLRA § 8(a)(3), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a) (8) (1970).
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is, all workers paying a pro rata share for benefits received. This
section des not require actual membership in the labor organiza-
tion, yet eliminates the "free rider." Section 14(b)-4 3 nullifies this
compromise when it allows states to enact laws prohibiting it.
The right-to-work laws should not be allowed to upset the bal-
ance of power at the collective bargaining table. If the laws are en-
acted to give an advantage to management or to weaken labor, the
object is not permissible and Section 14 (b) is providing a means for
abuse of the national labor policy. There could be no valid reason for
Congress allowing the states to determine the relative strength of the
parties, to the collective bargaining process after having concocted
the elaborate scheme encompassed in the National Labor Relations
Act to achieve the same purpose.
Section 14 (b) permits an erratic application of the national labor
policy among the states. The net result of 14 (b) is a crazy pattern
which has thirty-one states subscribing to the provisos of Section
8 (a) (3) and nineteen states with right-to-work laws which apply to
everyone in those states except railroad and airline workers. Because
Section 2, Eleventh of the Railway Labor Act is controlling in all fif-
ty states notwithstanding any right-to-work law, there is a major in-
consistency without apparent justification between the labor policy
under the NLRA and RLA.
As an adjunct to the federal scheme of labor regulation, the right-
to-work law adds very little of value to the panoply of protections
accorded the individual worker. The right-to-work issue has achieved
a certain credibility at the state level so that it can effectively be
used to corrupt other meaningful proceedings, yet be of little legal
significance.
The best solution to the conflict between freedom to associate
and "free rider" has been the one devised over the years by the North
Dakota Attorneys General, 14 now set aside by the North Dakota
Supreme Court. 145 The opinions of the attorney general put into prac-
tice the theoretical prospect envisioned by the United States Supreme
Court in the Hanson'4 6 and Street14 7 decisions: expenditure of com-
pulsory exactions should be closely related to the process of collec-
tive bargaining. Payment of a service fee for benefits received can-
not seriously be considered repugnant to any constitutional princi-
ple; it should not make any difference if the individual receiving the
benefits necessarily endorsed the legal means for achieving them.
The right-to-work movement has made contributions to the devel-
143. N LIA § 14(b), 29 U.S.C. § 164(b) (1970).
144. Op., supra note 11, at 142.
145. Ficek v. International Bhd. of Boilermakers, 219 N.W.2d 860 (N.D. 1974).
146. Railway Employees' Dept. v. Hanson, 351 U.S. 225 (1956).
147. Machinists v. Street. 367 U.S. 740 (1961).
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opment of American labor law, but its period of usefulness has been
spent. Section 14 (b) which gave the movement life at the state level
has also served its purpose. In the stead of Section 14 (b) statutory or
judicially-created assurances should be provided: (1) that bona fide
religious objectors or conscientious objectors will be granted an ex-
ception to union security provisions or at a minimum some accommo-
dation, and (2) that compulsory tolls collected within the federally-
provided framework be expended for purposes "closely related" to
the process of collective bargaining.

